با همکاری مشترک دانشگاه پیام نور و انجمن روانشناسی اجتماعی ایران

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری روانشناسی تربیتی دانشگاه تبریز

2 دانشیار دانشکده روانشناسی دانشگاه تبریز

3 کارشناس کامپیوتر دانشگاه صنعتی ارومیه

چکیده

مقدمه: تحقیقات اخیر نظریه ذهن بیان داشته‌اند که افراد در برخی موقعیت‌های اجتماعی بدون ضرورت، دیدگاه دیگران را محاسبه می‌کنند. برخی نیز به‌پیش فرض بودن دیدگاه خود اشاره کرده‌اند. بحث خودکاری ذهن‌خوانی مدتی مورد مناقشه تحقیقات بود وهم اکنون نیز فرایندهای درگیر در ذهن‌خوانی موردتوجه محققان است. در این تحقیق هدف ما بررسی محدودیت‌های ذهن‌خوانی خودکار با توجه به نوع دیدگاه دیگران است. روش: به همین منظور یک طرح عاملی درون‌گروهی طراحی گردید و از بین دانش‌آموزان دبیرستانی شاغل به تحصیل در سال 1392 ـ 93 شهر سهند، 25 آزمودنی به شیوه در دسترس انتخاب شد. آزمودنی‌ها به‌واسطه ابزار ساخته شده توسط محقق برای سرعت و صحت ذهن‌خوانی مورد سنجش قرار گرفتند. یافته‌ها: نتایج حاصل از تحلیل واریانس مکرر نشان داد که اثرات اصلی نوع دیدگاه (007/0P=)، نوع قضاوت (001/0P=)و همچنین اثر تعاملی این دو(001/0P=)معنادار است. همچنین نتایج آزمون تی همبسته نشان می‌دهد که قضاوت‌ها در موقعیت دیدگاه مساوی نسبت به دیدگاه ناقص (02/0P=) و مشابه (005/0P=)سریع‌تر است. نتیجه‌گیری: با توجه به این یافته‌ها به نظر می‌رسد که دیدگاه مساوی یک موقعیت بهینه برای ذهن‌خوانی باشد. نتایج چالش‌هایی را برای فرضیه آپلی به همراه داشت.
 

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Is the Mind Reading Limited by Others’ Perspective?

نویسندگان [English]

  • saeed farmani 1
  • Rahim Badri 2
  • Zahra Shafiei 3

1 Ph.D. Student in Educational Phycology, Tabriz University

2 Associate Professor in Psychology, Tabriz University

3 Ms. Computer Science, Urmia University of Technology

چکیده [English]

Aims: Recent research suggests that in some conditions people process others’ perspective without any necessity. Also, some studies indicatethat we compute our perspective initially during mindreading. The automatic mindreading led to some dispute and the processes involved in mindreading are these days the focus of attention of researchers. This study aimed at determining the limitations of automatic mindreading with respect to others’ perspective. Method: For this purpose, a within subject project was performed. By accessible sampling method, 25 high school students were selected from Sahand Cityin 2013-2014 academic year. The Participants were tested by an instrument made by authors that measuredthe speed and accuracy of mind reading. Results: The results from repeated measure revealed that the main effects of perspective type (P=0.007), judgment type (P=0.001) and the interactive effect of these two (P=0.001) are significant. Furthermore, the results of pairwise comparisons showed that judgments in equal perspective situation are faster than similar (P=0.02) and incomplete (P=0.005) situations. Conclusion: According to the results, itseems that equal perspective is an optimized situation for mindreading. The results have some challenges for Apply’s theory.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Theory of Mind
  • Visual Perspective Taking
  • Mind Reading
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