- Barber, B. M., Heath, C., & Odean, T. (2003). "Good reasons sell: Reasonbased choice among group and individual investors in the stock market". Management Science, 49,1636–1652.
- Bloom, P. (2010). "How do morals change?" Nature, 464, 490–490.
- Broome, J. (2013). Rationality through reasoning. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Bucciarelli, M., & Daniele, M. (2015). "Reasoning in moral conflicts". Thinking & Reasoning, 21,265–294.
- Bucciarelli, M., Khemlani, S., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2008). "They psychology of moral reasoning". Judgment and Decision Making, 3,121–139.
- Crisp, R. (2005). "Value, reasons and the structure of justification: How to avoid passing the buck". Analysis, 65, 80-85.
- Dietrich, F., & List, C. (2016). "Reason-based choice and contextdependence: An explanatory framework". Economics and Philosophy, 32, 175–229.
- Ditto, P. H., Munro, G. D., Apanovitch, A. M., Scepansky, J. A., & Lockhart, L. K. (2003). "Spontaneous skepticism: The interplay of motivation and expectation in responses to favorable and unfavorable medical diagnoses". Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 1120–1132.
- Evers, D. (2010). "The end-relational theory of ‘ought’ and the weight of reasons". Dialectica, 64,405–417.
- Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002). "How (and where) does moral judgment work?" Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6,517-523.
- Haidt, J. (2001). "The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment". Psychological Review, 108, 814–834.
- Haidt, J. (2007). "The new synthesis in moral psychology". Science, 316, 998–1002.
- Haidt, J., & Hersh, M. A. (2001). "Sexual morality: The cultures and emotions of conservatives and liberals". Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31,191-221.
- Haidt, J., Bjorklund, F., & Murphy, S. (2000). "Moral dumbfounding: When intuition finds no reason". Lund Psychological Reports, 1.
- Haidt, J., Koller, S. H., & Dias, M. G. (1993). "Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65,613-628.
- Horne, Z., Powell, D., & Hummel, J. (2015). "A single counterexample leads to moral belief revision". Cognitive Science, 39,1950–1964.
- Hume, D. (1965). An enquiry concerning the principles of morals. NotreDame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. (Original work published 1777).
- Kearns, S., & Star, D. (2009). "Reasons as evidence". Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 4, 215–242.
- Kearns, S., & Star, D. (2013). "Weighing reasons". Journal of Moral Philosophy,10,70-86.
- Kunda, Z. (1990). "The case for motivated reasoning". Psychological Bulletin,108,480-498.
- Luo, Q., Nakic, M., Wheatley, T., Richell, R., Martin, A., & Blair, R. J. R. (2006). "The neural basis of implicit moral attitude—An IAT study using event-related fMRI". NeuroImage, 30, 1449-1457.
- Maki, A., & Raimi, K. T. (2017). "Environmental peer persuasion: How moral exporting and belief superiority relate to efforts to influence others". Journal of Environmental Psychology, 49,18-29.
- Morgan, G. S., Skitka, L. J., & Wisneski, D. C. (2010). "Moral and religious convictions and intentions to vote in the 2008 presidential election". Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 10,307–320.
- Paxton, J. M., & Greene, J. D. (2010). "Moral reasoning: Hints and allegations". Topics in Cognitive Science, 2, 511–527. - Norton, M. I., Vandello, J. A., & Darley, J. M. (2004). "Casuistry and social category bias". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87,817–831.
- Paxton, J. M., Ungar, L., & Greene, J. D. (2012). "Reflection and reasoning in moral judgment". Cognitive Science, 36, 163–177.
- Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P. (2003). "The intelligence of the moral intuitions: Comment on Haidt (2001)". Psychological Review, 110,193–196.
- Ross, W. D. (1930). The right and the good. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
- Royzman, E. B., Kim, K., & Leeman, R. F. (2015). "The curious tale of Julie and Mark: Unraveling the moral dumbfounding effect". Judgment and Decision Making, 10, 296.
- Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). "The neural basis of economic decision-making in the Ultimatum Game". Science, 300, 1755–1758.
- Skitka, L. J. (2010). "The psychology of moral conviction". Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4,267–281.
- Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Sargis, E. G. (2005). "Moral conviction: Another contributor to attitude strength or something more?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88,895–917.
- Snedegar, J. (2017). "Reasons for and reasons against". Philosophical Studies. Advance online publication.
- Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). "Reasons Probably Won’t Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions". Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. Advance online publication.
- Stanley, M. L., Henne, P., Iyengar, V., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & De Brigard, F. (2017). "I’m not the person I used to be: The self and autobiographical memories of immoral actions". Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146,884 – 895.
- Strohminger, N., & Nichols, S. (2014). "The essential moral self". Cognition, 131,159–171.
- Turiel, E. (2002). The culture of morality: Social development, context, and conflict. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Ugazio, G., Lamm, C., & Singer, T. (2012). "The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario". Emotion, 12, 579–590.
- Uhlmann, E., & Cohen, G. L. (2005). "Constructed criteria: Redefining merit to justify discrimination". Psychological Science, 16,474–480.
- Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2006). "Manipulations of emotional context shape moral judgment". Psychological Science, 17, 476–477.
- Vlaev, I., Chater, N., Lewis, R., & Davies, G. (2009). "Reason-based judgments: Using reasons to decouple perceived price– quality correlation". Journal of Economic Psychology, 30,721–731.
- Wheatley, T., & Haidt, J. (2005). "Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe". Psychological Science, 16, 780–784.
- Zajonc, R. B. (1980). "Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences". American Psychologist, 35, 151–175.
)